Inverting the flexicurity paradigm: the United Kingdom and zero hours contracts by Kenner, Jeff
 1  Tony Blair MP, Introduction,  Fairness at Work (White Paper, Cm 3968, 1998):  webarchive.nation-
alarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.berr.gov.uk/fi les/fi le24436.pdf. 
 2  See  A  Adams ,  M  Freedland and  J  Prassl ,  The  ‘ Zero-Hours Contract ’ : Regulating casual work, or 
legitimating precarity ? ( European Labour Law Network Working Paper No 5 ,  March 2015 )  5 . 
 3  Z  Adams and  S  Deakin ,  Re-regulating Zero Hours Contracts ( Institute of Employment Rights , 
 2014 )  6 . 
 4  Mailway (Southern) Ltd v Wilsher [ 1978 ]   ICR 511 (Kilner Brown J) . 
 5  A Adams, M Freedland and J Prassl (n 2) 7. 
 10 
 Inverting the Flexicurity Paradigm: 
The United Kingdom and 
Zero Hours Contracts 
 JEFF  KENNER 
 I. Introduction 
 If the United Kingdom has, to quote one former Prime Minister,  ‘ the most lightly 
regulated labour market of any leading economy in the world ’ , 1 the phenomenon 
that has become known as the  ‘ zero hours contract ’ (ZHC) is a meme that has 
entered into societal discourse as connotative of the ultimate form of the legal-
ised commodifi cation of labour. The ZHC, as a label, is colloquial and legally 
specious, in the absence of an accepted cognisable normative defi nition for the 
types of contract to which it is applied. As there is no single typology, it is best 
to understand ZHCs as encompassing a  ‘ wide spectrum ’ of casual work con-
tracts, 2 under which, in essence,  ‘ an employer agrees to pay for work done but 
makes no commitment to provide a set number of hours of work per day, week 
or month ’ . 3 Zero hours arrangements can simply be described as a mix between 
casual labour and part-time work. 4 Nevertheless, despite the absence of a  ‘ clear or 
overarching category or organising principle ’ , 5 the widespread use of these types 
of contract in the UK makes a study of ZHCs pertinent in the context of the core/
contingent dichotomy as, fi rstly, in many cases, zero hours workers (ZHWs)  perceive 
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themselves as  having no contract for continuing employment, and secondly, these 
workers often do not have access to the fi rm ’ s  ‘ internal labour market ’ of collective 
agreements, pensions and security. 6 It is necessary, however, when analysing the 
zero hours phenomenon, and proposing reforms of the law, to take heed of the 
warning that any attempt at regulation  ‘ must  … be approached most cautiously, 
so as not to become merely an exercise in normalising a wide array of precarious 
arrangements ’ . 7 
 The rise in ZHCs is a feature of globalisation and, throughout the EU, vari-
ous forms of zero hours contracting are multiplying often in the form of  ‘ on call ’ 
working but, in several EU Member States, subject to specifi c minimum standards ’ 
requirements to protect workers. 8 In the UK, however, where zero hours work-
ing is part of a long-term trend towards more fl exibility and diversity in working 
arrangements, 9 these forms of contract have become synonymous with the  ‘ most 
extreme form ’ 10 of precarious employment that the EU ’ s most casualised labour 
market has spawned. Within the boundaries set by UK law for permissible employ-
ment contracts, ZHCs offer total fl exibility to the employer to choose if and when 
to offer work, 11 so as minimise cost and maximise profi tability, and, conversely, 
total insecurity for the worker, who has no guarantee of a stable income or social 
security. ZHCs represent contingency max, an inversion of the European  ‘ fl exicu-
rity ’ paradigm of an inclusive labour market that meets the need of workers for 
both fl exibility and security throughout their working lives. 12 
 In part two of this chapter, the emergence and rise of the culture of zero hours 
working in the UK ’ s fl exible labour market is explored in the light of increasing 
concerns about the use of ZHCs by some companies and organisations as part of 
their business model. Part three assesses the legal status and employment rights 
of workers on ZHCs. Part four discusses the lawfulness of ZHCs and proposals 
for reform of the law to end exploitation of ZHWs. Part fi ve concludes with some 
suggestions for widening the scope of employment protection. 
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 II. The Culture of Zero Hours Work in the UK 
 A. Zero Hours Work: The Raw Facts 
 According to estimates from the UK Offi ce for National Statistics (ONS), 801,000 
people, 2.5 per cent of those in employment, had a ZHC as their main employment 
contract in the period from October to December 2015. 13 This was an increase of 
15 per cent from the same period in 2014, when the total was 697,000 or 2.3 per 
cent of people in employment. However, because many people have more than 
one ZHC, or have a ZHC in addition to a standard full-time or part-time employ-
ment contract, and the numbers of ZHCs vary seasonally, the total number of 
ZHCs at the mid-point of the survey period stood at a much higher 1.7 million, or 
6 per cent of all employment contracts. 14 The ONS also identifi ed a further two mil-
lion ZHCs where no work was carried out either because workers were not accepting 
work for personal reasons or, due to fl uctuating demand, no work was available in 
the reference period. 15 10 per cent of businesses as a whole make use of ZHCs with 
a much larger 40 per cent of businesses that employ 250 or more people. 16 For the 
purpose of these statistics, the ONS defi nes ZHCs broadly as contracts  ‘ that do not 
guarantee a minimum number of hours ’ , based on a survey of businesses. 17 
 People on ZHCs are more likely to be young, part-time, women, and students 
in full-time education, when compared to the UK workforce as a whole. 18 This 
is hardly surprising as jobs on the periphery  ‘ tend to be taken by people who are 
already disadvantaged in the labour market for other reasons ’ . 19 The statistics 
reveal that 38 per cent are aged 16 to 24 compared with 12 per cent for all people 
not on a ZHC. 20 Such contracts are most prevalent in low paid sectors such as 
hotels, catering, retail and leisure. 21 63 per cent of ZHWs work part-time with an 
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average of 26 weekly hours, with 17 per cent working no hours in the surveyed 
week. 22 More than one in three, 37 per cent, would like to work more hours with 
most wanting those additional hours in the same job. 23 
 Research by the Resolution Foundation reveals that the growth in the number 
of workers employed on ZHCs is a factor in the general  ‘ squeeze ’ on low wages 
as ZHWs receive lower gross weekly pay, an average of  £ 236 per week, compared 
with  £ 482 per week for those who are not on ZHCs. 24 Moreover, because workers 
on ZHCs work fewer hours than workers on standard contracts, the growing use 
of ZHCs is a contributory factor in rising rates of under-employment. 25 Many 
ZHWs have the experience of being  ‘ zeroed-down ’ when the amount of work on 
offer reduces week by week and eventually dries up altogether. 26 
 One side-effect of the fl uctuations in working hours and pay, which go hand in 
hand with ZHCs, is a negative impact for the workers concerned when they are 
required to interact with the UK welfare system. As earnings fall, workers on ZHCs 
may revert to claiming Jobseeker ’ s Allowance (JSA) to supplement their income. 
Under the JSA system, a claimant can be disqualifi ed from benefi t, or sanctioned, 
for refusing a direction to take work and may face the loss of all social security 
benefi ts for a certain period. 27 Under the new system of Universal Credit, which is 
gradually replacing JSA and other benefi ts, 28 even more stringent conditionality 
will be applied, which  ‘ will increase the pressure on individuals to accept casual-
ised forms of employment ’ . 29 In practice, this might mean that a worker in such a 
predicament, who refuses to accept an offer of zero hours work because they are 
seeking more regular hours, could be subjected to a sanction and loss of benefi ts. 30 
The UK Government does not accept that ZHCs are, by default, unsuitable and is 
prepared to  ‘ mandate ’ ZHCs for job-seekers on Universal Credit. 31 Overall, as Zoe 
Adams and Simon Deakin note, the cumulative effect of these and other social 
security changes has made the UK system of unemployment compensation  ‘ one 
of the least protective in the developed world ’ . 32 There is no doubt that the threat 
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of the removal of the safety net of social security is a key driver in the growth of 
ZHCs and other forms of precarious work in the UK labour market. 33 
 Many of the most vulnerable ZHWs now form part of an increasing  ‘ precariat ’ 
in the UK, described by Guy Standing as  ‘ a multitude of insecure people, living 
bits-and-pieces lives, in and out of short-term jobs, without a narrative of occu-
pational development ’ . 34 Such workers, denied the certainty of work, are under 
constant pressure because they simply do not know, from week to week, whether 
they can pay the rent or household bills or clothe their children. 35 
 Nevertheless, it is argued by some that ZHCs are  ‘ unfairly demonised ’ because 
many ZHWs benefi t from the fl exibility that such arrangements offer. 36 These 
workers prefer adaptable working hours ’ contracts because they do not wish to 
work at fi xed and regular times from week to week. Flexible hours contracts suit 
many students, single people, carers and older or retired workers, who wish to use 
zero hours work to  ‘ blend paid work with other domestic commitments, educa-
tion or other personal, family or community interests ’ . 37 According to a survey 
by the Charter Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD), ZHWs are more 
likely to be satisfi ed with their work-life balance (65 per cent) when compared to 
all employees (58 per cent), and have similar overall job satisfaction levels with 
those working on more standard employment contracts. 38 This is somewhat at 
odds with the fi ndings of research conducted by the Resolution Foundation that, 
for the majority of people employed on these types of contract, the freedom and 
choice they ostensibly offer is  ‘ more apparent than real ’ . 39 
 The immediate question, therefore, is whether such an uncertain but fl exible 
form of working, desirable for some, should be permitted for those for whom 
it is convenient, when others, for whom ZHCs are not a matter of choice, seek, 
and indeed need, regular hours, secure employment and an end to a vicious cycle 
of personal and fi nancial precariousness. Additionally, we must ask, when such 
uncertainty inexorably leads to exploitation, what steps should be taken to prevent 
the abuse of such contractual arrangements or indeed to outlaw them altogether if 
no other solution can be found. In seeking to fi nd answers to these questions, we 
fi rst need to understand the motivation and the method of those employers who 
have made ZHCs a central part of their business model. 
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 B. Zero Hours Contracts — ‘ Demutualising ’ the Employment 
Relationship 
 According to research by the Resolution Foundation, there are four main rea-
sons why ZHCs are attractive for UK employers. 40 First, they allow employers to 
maximise the fl exibility of their workforce to more easily adjust to variations in 
demand, which may help them cope with an economic downturn. As the authors 
put it bluntly:  ‘ zero-hours contracts allow an employer to transfer the burden of 
varying demand onto the workforce ’ . 41 This process of burden shifting is an exam-
ple of what Freedland and Kountouris have aptly described as  ‘ demutualisation ’ , 
a term used to describe the many ways in which employers may seek to transfer 
economic risks that they would normally have to bear onto the workforce. 42 Of 
course, it is also sometimes the case that such workforce fl exibility may be intro-
duced to provide fl exibility for individual staff. 43 Second, ZHCs allow employers 
to better manage costs, keeping wages down, and reduce risk. If a major contract 
falls through, ZHWs hours can be zeroed down  ‘ at a stroke ’ . 44 Third, recruitment 
and training costs are reduced because ZHWs are, in practice, a pool of trained 
workers ready to bring in as and when required and, therefore, save the employer 
the cost of hiring and training new workers or using an agency. Fourth, some 
employers may, anecdotal evidence suggests, use ZHCs to avoid employment obli-
gations such as maternity leave and redundancy pay. 45 The extent to which ZHCs 
actually enable employers to evade employment protection laws will be considered 
further in part three below. 
 In the CIPD survey, 45 per cent of employers reported using ZHCs as part of 
a long-term strategy. 46 Many public sector organisations in the UK have made 
ZHCs a central part of their business model. In the public and non-profi t sectors, 
the use of ZHCs is common in order to respond to fl uctuations in demand to 
meet needs, such as education and health care, and to manage tight budgets. Many 
organisations, such as Moorfi eld Eye Hospital National Health Service (NHS) 
Foundation Trust and Outlook Care, have introduced  ‘ staff banks ’ of ZHWs to be 
called in to meet unpredictable demand for care, reduce the need for agency staff, 
cut overtime and fi ll in for sickness absence and holidays. 47 Such practices are 
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increasingly common in the care sector where 23 per cent of the adult social care 
workforce are on ZHCs. 48 
 In the private sector, signifi cant users of ZHCs include major retailers (Tesco, 
Sports Direct, Amazon), hotel chains (Holiday Inn), vehicle hirers (Hertz), food 
outlets (Subway, McDonalds), pub chains (Wetherspoons), and entertainment 
businesses (Cineworld). 49 For example, all 300 of Hertz UK ’ s drivers are ZHWs. 
In a highly competitive market, the use of ZHWs meets fl uctuating customer 
demand, varying from season to season. While this causes uncertainty for the 
workers, Hertz classifi es its ZHWs as employees and provides them with con-
tracts similar to those of its permanent staff. 50 In other cases, such as Holiday Inn, 
15 per cent of ZHWs typically progress to permanent contracts. 51 Nevertheless, a 
study by the Work Foundation found that 44 per cent of ZHWs have had the same 
employer for two years and 25 per cent have been with the same employer for fi ve 
years or more. 52 
 The media, sometimes using undercover investigations, have revealed many 
examples of alleged abuses. For example, an expos é by Channel 4 News found 
heavy reliance on ZHWs at Amazon ’ s massive packing warehouse at Rugeley in 
Staffordshire. According to former workers, staff were  ‘ forced to make themselves 
available for work with no guarantee they will be offered a shift on a particular 
day ’ . 53 Claims were made of GPS tracking of staff to monitor their movements 
and airport-style security searches of staff for stolen goods during meal breaks. 54 
 Much of the media coverage has focused on Sports Direct, one of the UK ’ s 
largest sportswear retailers, which has developed a business model that is almost 
totally reliant on zero hours contracting and other  ‘ demutualising ’ or burden 
shifting practices. More than eight in ten of the company ’ s 27,000 workers are 
on ZHCs. 55 Following a lawsuit over its use of ZHCs in November 2014, Sports 
Direct, as part of a settlement, agreed to make clear in its job advertisements and 
employment contracts that there would be no guarantee of work and also to pro-
duce clear written policies on the entitlement of staff to sick pay and holiday pay. 56 
Further legal action has been brought by unions against the company ’ s policy of 
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excluding ZHWs from its bonus schemes. 57 Sports Direct have hit back arguing 
that ZHCs  ‘ work well for the vast majority of our casual staff as well as it does for 
the company ’ . 58 Under mounting pressure from a UK Parliamentary enquiry over 
allegations of paying its warehouse staff less than the National Minimum Wage, 59 
 ‘ zeroing out ’ staff who fail to keep up with sales targets, and  ‘ naming and shaming ’ 
workers using loudspeakers, the company has agreed to carry out a review of its 
processes. 60 
 Evidence from the CIPD suggests that zero hours contracting is increasing as 
 ‘ employers seek more variable or contingent forms of work to manage business 
uncertainty in the face of fi erce competition and tight budget constraints ’ . The 
CIPD advises that employers should only use them when the inherent fl exibility of 
the arrangement  ‘ suits both the organisation and the individual ’ . This leads us to 
consider, in the next part, the employment status of this growing army of ZHWs 
and the contractual rights of these most contingent workers for whom  ‘ demutuali-
sation ’ has pushed them to the outermost boundaries of labour law. 61 
 III. Zero Hours Working — Legal Status and the Scope of 
Employment Protection 
 ‘ Contracts of service must not be turned into contracts of slavery ’  
 ( De Francesco v Barnum [1890] 45 Ch D 430 (Fry LJ)) 
 A. Introduction 
 As outlined in the introduction of this chapter, ZHCs are  ‘ enormously varied ’ 62 
and, as such, there is no  ‘ unitary notion of the Zero Hours Contract ’ . 63 The term 
ZHC may include various types of  ‘ work arrangements  … for which there are no 
fi xed or guaranteed hours of remunerated work ’ . 64 It is not just the heterogene-
ity of these contracts, but their intangibility, that poses challenges both for the 
 common law tribunals and courts in the UK and also for the legislator. For the 
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judiciary, the main challenge is to interpret each individual contractual arrange-
ment in its specifi c employment law context, while for the legislator, the main 
task is to draft laws that provide, at least, for the outlawing of abuses of ZHCs and 
which may go further to provide ZHWs with the minimum standard of employ-
ment protection normally available to core workers. In order to frame this discus-
sion, in this part, we must address the employment status of ZHWs and identify 
the scope and limitations of employment protection afforded to them. 
 B. Employment Status of Zero Hours Workers 
 Employment status in the UK is determined by the operation of what Anne Davies 
has identifi ed as the  ‘ main organising concepts ’ of employment law, 65 specifi cally, 
in this context, the concepts of  ‘ employee ’ and  ‘ worker ’ . We must fi rst seek to deter-
mine whether the ZHW is an  ‘ employee ’ with a  ‘ contract of employment ’ . 66 This 
prioritisation is important because the existence of a contract of employment, 
which is the foundation for  ‘ employee ’ status, operates as a passport for the indi-
vidual to be afforded the fullest protection that is available under employment law. 
Formally, as emphasised by the use of suffi xes, an  ‘ employ ee ’ is a counterpart to an 
 ‘ employ er ’ , suggesting a certain kind of relational equilibrium between the con-
tracting parties, but this notional sense of equality is illusory because the statutory 
 ‘ contract of employment ’ is defi ned as a  ‘ contract of service ’ , 67 directly drawn from 
the common law hierarchical relation of master and servant. It is the common law 
tests evolving from this relation that have become the benchmark for UK Employ-
ment Tribunals 68 to establish, on a case by case basis, the existence of a contract 
of employment. 
 The common law tests are somewhat fl uid but require evidence of elements of: 
 ‘ control ’ , indicating a measure of subordination of the employee to the employer; 
 ‘ risk ’ , or economic reality, identifying the employer as the person who takes the 
economic risk in the relationship; and  ‘ mutuality of obligation ’ , a variant of the 
control test, whereby the employee is obliged to accept work when it is offered to 
him or her by the employer. 69 
 Among these tests, it is mutuality of obligation that is the most problematic for 
those working under ZHCs. The mutuality of obligation test is founded on the 
notion that the contract of employment is more than a mere wage/work bargain 
between the parties but rather, as Mark Freedland has explained, there is a  second 
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level of obligation of mutual promises of future performance. 70 These are  ‘ the 
mutual undertakings to maintain the employment relationship in being which are 
inherent in any contract of employment so called ’ . 71 The problem with this test 
for ZHWs arises from the weight it places on a promise made by the worker to be 
available to serve the employer when required, on an ongoing basis, even where 
there is uncertainty about whether, if at all, the employer will promise future work 
and for how long. It is even more diffi cult in cases where ZHWs are dependent 
on a series of short  ‘ spot contracts ’ , sometimes with more than one employer, in 
which there is no contract in force between engagements. 72 Is it possible for each 
of these separate wage/work bargains, if they are with the same employer, to be 
joined together into what is known as a  ‘ global contract ’ if there is evidence of an 
ongoing mutuality of obligation during and between each hiring ? 73 
 Two late twentieth century court judgments illustrate how the mutuality of 
obligations test has been elaborated in cases involving casual or intermittent 
workers who might nowadays be described as  ‘ zero hours workers ’ . The fi rst case, 
 O ’ Kelly , 74 concerned a group of hotel wine waiters described as  ‘ regular casuals ’ in 
the contractual documents. Under the arrangement, the wine waiters were avail-
able for hire periodically to cater at functions and were expected to offer their 
services. The waiters could turn down an offer of work but, under a preferential 
list system, those who refused work would be removed from the list. In practice, 
many worked long hours in the hotel most weeks and had not refused offers of 
work. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales upheld the fi nding 
of an Employment Tribunal that, under the arrangement, there was no obliga-
tion for the hotel to provide work and no obligation on the waiters to offer their 
services. This meant that, according to the Court, each individual hiring of the 
waiters for a function was a singular wage/work bargain without the necessary 
mutuality of obligation and, further, there was no global contract of employment 
spanning these bargains. Without the necessary mutuality, the waiters were merely 
independent contractors choosing to work for the hotel as a client. To the extent 
that there was an exchange of promises between the parties, these promises were 
not strong enough to amount to mutual obligations to maintain the relationship 
on an ongoing basis. 75 There was also interplay between the absence of mutual-
ity of obligation and the  ‘ risk ’ test because, by being able to exercise a choice to 
work, rather than having an obligation, the waiters  ‘ bore the risk of the absence 
of work ’ . 76 
 163Inverting the Flexicurity Paradigm
 77  Carmichael v National Power Plc [ 1999 ]  1 WLR 2042 (HL) . 
 78  See  H  Collins ,  ‘ Employment Rights of Casual Workers ’ ( 2000 )  29 ILJ 73 ,  73 . 
 79  Now replaced by the UK Supreme Court. 
 80  Carmichael v National Power Plc [ 1999 ]  1 WLR 2042 (HL) . 
 81  In each case, statute limits the protection to  ‘ employees ’ ; see for example the Employment Rights 
Act 1996 s 94(1) concerning unfair dismissal. 
 82  Employment Rights Act 1996 s 80F. 
 83  A Adams, M Freedland and J Prassl (n 2) 15. 
 84  Wilson v Circular Distributors Ltd [ 2006 ]   IRLR 38 (EAT) . 
 85  Cotswold Developments Ltd v Williams [ 2006 ]  IRLR 181 (EAT) [55] . 
 In the second case,  Carmichael , 77 two tour guides at a power station were hired 
on a  ‘ casual as required ’ basis. Like the waiters in  O ’ Kelly , these women had no 
minimum hours of work and were simply offered work and performed it when-
ever the employer decided that they were needed. Each party bore a risk of the una-
vailability of labour. 78 When the case reached the House of Lords, 79 Lord Irvine, 
in the leading judgment, observed that the documentation signed by the parties 
pointed to an absence of the  ‘ irreducible minimum ’ of mutual obligation neces-
sary to create a contract of service. He noted that, in practice, both tour guides had 
not been available for work on several occasions when it had been offered indicat-
ing an absence of mutuality. Lord Irvine approved of what we would understand 
today as zero hours contracting, commenting, with gendered undertones, that 
 ‘ [t]his fl exibility of approach was well suited to their family needs. Just as the need 
for tours was unpredictable so also were their domestic commitments. Flexibility 
suited both sides. ’ 80 The price that these women paid for this  ‘ domestic ’ conveni-
ence and  ‘ fl exibility ’ for their  ‘ family needs ’ was to be denied the right to seek some 
of the most basic protection afforded by UK employment law, including the right 
to claim unfair dismissal, the right to a redundancy payment and the right to take 
maternity leave and parental leave, all of which are reserved exclusively for those 
granted the status of  ‘ employee ’ . 81 If the same conclusion were reached today in a 
similar case, such workers would even be denied the right to request fl exible work-
ing, which is also confi ned to  ‘ employees ’ . 82 
 In more recent cases, however, the courts have made  ‘ much less aggressive use ’ 83 
of the strict mutuality of obligation approach laid down in  O ’ Kelly and  Carmichael . 
In  Wilson , 84 it was held that absence of mutuality means there is no obligation 
on either party to perform work. Therefore, if, as in many zero hours arrange-
ments, an employer is not obliged to offer work but, when it is offered, it must be 
accepted by the worker, that worker would have the necessary obligation required 
for a contract of employment. In such a case, there might not be a positive mutual 
obligation but there would not be an absence of mutuality. Further, in  Williams , it 
was found that a refusal to accept work was not fatal to being awarded  ‘ employee ’ 
status  ‘ if there is some obligation upon an individual to work, and some obligation 
upon the other party to provide or pay for it ’ . 85 
 The mutuality of obligation test will be applied on the basis of the facts, which 
gives considerable latitude to an Employment Tribunal (ET) hearing a particular 
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case. For example, in  Haggerty , 86 a worker who was on a list of casuals was found 
to be under a contract of employment for each shift she worked and, although 
there was no guarantee of minimum hours of work, on the facts, it was shown that 
the claimant had an expectation of a reasonable amount of work. As in  O ’ Kelly , 
it was understood that refusal to accept offers of work would lead to her removal 
from the employer ’ s list of casuals. On appeal, the Employment Appeal Tribunal 
(EAT) approved the emphasis given by the ET on the need to deduce the intention 
of the parties from their conduct over a long period of time. This evidence was 
 ‘ just suffi cient ’ to point to an ongoing mutuality of obligations between shifts. 87 
 Haggerty suggests that, in the case of a ZHW who is  ‘ on call ’ , and thus required to 
be available to work, the obligation on the employer to offer work can be inferred 
as a reciprocal obligation. 88 
 After  O ’ Kelly , it was common for employers to put  ‘ no mutuality of obligations ’ 
clauses into contracts with casual or intermittent workers. How strictly should 
such clauses be interpreted and how much scope is there for a broader contex-
tual interpretation of the parties ’ statements ? The traditional  ‘ contract ’ approach 
to interpretation is very strict indeed as typifi ed by the majority of the Court of 
Appeal in  Kalwak , which held that an express  ‘ no obligations clause ’ could only 
be shown to be a  ‘ sham ’ if  ‘ at the time of the contract, both parties [must have 
intended the term] to misrepresent their true actual relationship ’ . 89 
 More recently, however, the higher courts have preferred an alternative 
 ‘ employment ’ approach to interpretation that looks beyond the content of any 
promises. 90 Smith LJ in  Szilagyi stressed that the task of the ET was to put such 
clauses in a wider employment context, to look at  ‘ the substance not the label ’ 
and recognise that  ‘ in the fi eld of work  … the reality may be that that the prin-
cipal/employer dictates what the written agreement will say and the contractor/
employee must take it or leave it ’ . 91 The Supreme Court in  Autoclenz 92 went fur-
ther, expressly rejecting the notion in  Kalwak of  ‘ common intent ’ to misrepresent 
because it implied a degree of equality between the parties that did not normally 
exist in an employment contract. Lord Clarke observed that: 
 ‘ [T]he relative bargaining power of the parties must be taken into account in deciding 
whether the terms of any written agreement in truth represents what was agreed and the 
 true agreement will often have to be gleaned from all the circumstances of the case, of 
which the written agreement is only a part. ’ 93 
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 Autoclenz matters because, for the most precariously situated workers, such as 
those on various forms of ZHCs, it is vital for tribunals to recognise that, whatever 
the formal terms, the contract of employment is to a large extent, as Kahn-Freund 
put it,  ‘ a fi gment of the legal mind ’ that conceals a  ‘ condition of subordination ’ . 94 
The more the worker needs work, any work, however infrequently it is offered, the 
more likely it is that he or she will have  ‘ take it or leave it ’ and accept the employer ’ s 
contractual terms. 95 
 The importance of  Autoclenz is illustrated by  Pulse Healthcare . 96 The case 
concerned the transfer of a contract for 24-hour care provision for a woman 
with severe physical disabilities in the context of the Transfer of Undertakings 
 (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006, known as TUPE. Under TUPE, 
any employees performing the relevant contract are normally transferred to the 
new contractor and their acquired employment rights are protected. Pulse, the 
transferee company, refused to agree to the transfer of the care workers respon-
sible for the care package from the transferor, Carewatch, on the basis that there 
was no mutuality of obligation. The workers had signed a document provided by 
 Carewatch entitled  ‘ Zero Hours Contract Agreement ’ . Apart from the title, many 
of the other provisions in the document referred to typical requirements of a con-
tract of employment such as annual leave and sickness leave entitlements. The 
document even set out  ‘ particulars of employment ’ as required for employees. 97 It 
did not exclude the workers from working for another employer but this was only 
possible when  ‘ unassigned ’ to Carewatch. Against the heading,  ‘ Hours of Employ-
ment ’ , the document stated  ‘ Zero hours ’ . In practice, however, it was shown that 
each of the carers worked an agreed number of hours per week varying from 24 
to 36. Not surprisingly, the Employment Judge found that the document  ‘ did not 
refl ect the true position ’ . 98 Once the work rota was fi xed the workers were required 
to work and the employer was required to provide that work. This was suffi cient 
to show mutuality of obligations. On appeal, the EAT found that the judgment was 
wholly in accord with  Autoclenz . 99 
 What is interesting about  Pulse Healthcare is not so much the application of 
 Autoclenz , but the approach of the EAT to the wage-work bargain. Each of the care 
workers were rostered for individual shifts. Such individual wage/work bargains 
can be regarded as  ‘ miniature contracts of employment ’ so long as, fi rstly, there are 
the necessary requirements of control and risk, 100 and, secondly, if the employer 
is obliged to pay the worker for the whole of the agreed shift. 101 This is important 
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because duration is not a decisive factor in establishing a contract of employment. 
If there is an absence of mutuality between each contract that will mean that the 
contract is legally unenforceable at common law, as in  O ’ Kelly and  Carmichael , 
but it does not mean that the worker has not acquired any statutory rights. 102 For 
example, certain employment rights, such as the right to a statement of employ-
ment particulars, or the right not to be dismissed for trade union membership, do 
not require a long period of continuity of employment. 103 
 In  Pulse Healthcare , these conditions were met and, moreover, in the interpreta-
tion of the EAT, the care workers were employed under a global contract which 
required mutual obligations to subsist for the entire period leading up to the 
transfer and no problem of lack of continuity of employment arose. 104 The EAT 
reached this conclusion because, although each worker was rostered for specifi c 
shifts, there were mutual obligations for the delivery of the whole care package 
on an ongoing basis including to cover for holidays and sickness. It followed that 
the care workers had global contracts of employment to work a certain number of 
hours each week in relation to the care package. 
 On the one hand, the outcome of  Pulse Healthcare can be seen as a positive for 
the employment protection of ZHWs. Workers designated by their employer as 
ZHWs may be found, on the particular facts, to be  ‘ employees ’ not just for specifi c 
engagements but on an ongoing basis, satisfying the mutuality of obligations. If 
it is possible to  ‘ join up ’ each shift, or miniature contract, a global contract can 
be established. This is important because, in order to access many employment 
rights in the UK, it is necessary to fulfi l a lengthy qualifying period of continuous 
employment. Continuity requirements are thus  ‘ an important fi lter for employ-
ment protection ’ . 105 For example, two years of continuous employment is required 
to bring a claim for unfair dismissal. 106 
 On the other hand,  Pulse Healthcare was a relatively straightforward case where 
the designation of the workers as  ‘ zero hours ’ was shown to be a rather obvious 
sham. Indeed, it is not the case, even after  Autoclenz , that the written agreement, 
if there is one, can simply be disregarded. In other cases, even if the worker can 
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 establish a series of contracts of employment, unless it is possible to convert those 
separate contracts into a global contract, casual or intermittent ZHWs will be fi l-
tered out of important areas of employment protection because they will not have 
the necessary continuity to bring claims. This is precisely what happened in the 
subsequent case of  Saha v Viewpoint Field Services Ltd , 107 in which a telephone 
interviewer who worked on an ad hoc basis for between seven and 43 hours almost 
every week for a year was found not to have mutuality of obligations because she 
was not obliged to work each week when work was offered and the employer was 
not obliged to offer her work. Even though she had been referred to by the employer 
as an  ‘ employee ’ and, during her shifts she had spot contracts of employment, she 
did not have mutuality of obligation and, therefore, was fi ltered out of protection 
against unfair dismissal because she had no global contract of employment. 108 
 UK legislation provides limited protection against fi ltering in cases that, on the 
facts, satisfy the requirements of  ‘ statutory continuity ’ under s. 212 of the Employ-
ment Rights Act 1996. Under this provision, any week  ‘ during the whole or part 
of which an employee ’ s relations with his employer are governed by a contract of 
employment counts in computing the employee ’ s contract of employment ’ . 109 If, 
however, there is a gap in employment on account of, inter alia,  ‘ a temporary ces-
sation of work ’ , that gap does not break the period of continuous employment. 110 
In this way, as Anne Davies explains, statutory continuity provides the  ‘ glue ’ to 
stick a series of short contracts of employment together to create one whole period 
of what is deemed to be continuous employment. 111 
 For example, in  Prater , 112 a teacher who taught pupils at their homes was given 
a different assignment lasting a varying period of time for each pupil she taught. 
There were gaps between teaching assignments including for holidays. The Court 
of Appeal held that there was a mutual obligation for each assignment in the sense 
that Ms Prater was obliged to teach the pupil and the Council was obliged to 
pay her. 113 Mummery LJ noted that the question as to whether each engagement 
was an individual work contract in which there were mutual obligations was not 
addressed in  O ’ Kelly and  Carmichael . 114 In  Prater , there were a succession of indi-
vidual work contracts in each of which there was mutuality of obligation. Once 
this was established, s 212  ‘ took care of the gaps between the individual contracts 
and secured continuity of employment ’ for the purposes of employment protec-
tion. 115 The signifi cance of the judgment is that, for the purpose of establishing 
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statutory continuity, if there is a temporary cessation, there is no need to consider 
the contractual position between each contract or whether there is ongoing mutu-
ality of obligation. 116 
 There is no doubt that statutory continuity does solve some problems for cer-
tain casual or intermittent ZHWs, who will have a series of capsuled contracts of 
employment that can be linked together, but may not be able to establish ongoing 
mutuality or a global contract. However, statutory continuity is not a golden bul-
let to solve all problems for ZHWs. Many cases will be unlike  Prater . For example, 
where no work is available from week to week because the work has already been 
allocated to other casual workers, the week will not count as a  ‘ temporary ces-
sation ’ and continuity will be broken. 117 In other cases, as in  Saha , 118 individual 
shifts, which may be erratic and unpredictable, will be found to lack mutuality of 
obligation and be distinguishable from  Prater . Such ZHWs will either have the 
status of  ‘ worker ’ , in which case they will have access to a more limited menu of 
employment rights, or, if they take on the risk of profi t and loss in the relation-
ship, 119 they will be deemed to be autonomous and self-employed. 
 The statutory term  ‘ worker ’ is defi ned in s 230(3)(b) of the Employment Rights 
Act 1996 as including contracts where  ‘ the individual undertakes to do or perform 
personally any work or services for another party to the contract whose status 
is not by virtue of the contract that of a client or customer of any profession or 
undertaking carried on by the individual ’ . 120  ‘ Worker ’ is an intermediate category 
lying between an  ‘ employee ’ who is dependent on the employer and an independ-
ent contractor who is self-employed. The statutory concept of the  ‘ worker ’ is 
designed to protect those who do not have suffi cient mutuality of obligation to be 
 ‘ employees ’ but are, unlike the self-employed,  ‘ semi-dependent ’ 121 on an employer 
and are normally in a subordinate position in the employment relation, although 
a relation of subordination is not necessarily essential. 122 
 Simon Deakin and Gillian Morris have explained the rationale for the  ‘ worker ’ 
concept in the following terms: 
 ‘ … the legislature has in essence taken the view that casual workers who would not nec-
essarily fall within  “ employee ” status should not, for that reason, be denied basic pro-
tections which do not depend, for their effective functioning, upon the employment 
relationship in question being regular or long-term ’. 123 
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 These  ‘ basic protections ’ include, inter alia, the right to be paid the National Liv-
ing Wage, 124 paid holidays and limits on working hours, 125 and protection against 
unauthorised pay deductions. 126 Those in  ‘ employment ’ , who have  ‘ a contract per-
sonally to do work ’ , 127 are also protected under the Equality Act 2010 against dis-
crimination on the grounds, inter alia, of age, sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion 
or belief, disability or sexual orientation. The Equality Act defi nition, although it 
does not use the term  ‘ worker ’ , is increasingly regarded as similar in meaning to 
the defi nition of  ‘ worker ’ in the Employment Rights Act. 128 
 To establish  ‘ worker ’ status it must be shown that the individual has a contract 
to perform work or services personally. Also, to more clearly distinguish workers 
from the wholly self-employed, an individual must not be a  ‘ client or customer ’ , 
which means that it is possible that an individual can run a business and be a 
worker  ‘ provided that the recipient of the business ’ s services cannot be described 
as a customer ’ . 129 
 As with the concept of  ‘ employee ’ , following  Autoclenz , the ET must look at the 
 ‘ true agreement ’ taking into account the conduct of the parties. In  Buckborough , 130 
for example, a bricklayer who had signed a document stating that he was self-
employed was found to be a  ‘ worker ’ on the facts. 
 Early case law on the  ‘ worker ’ concept tended to blur the tests for  ‘ employee ’ and 
 ‘ worker ’ by suggesting that some, more limited, degree of mutuality of obligation 
between the parties was required for  ‘ worker ’ status. 131 More recently, the courts 
have developed a distinctive interpretation of  ‘ worker ’ , emphasising the need for 
an obligation on the part of the  ‘ worker ’ to perform work or services personally. 132 
This will cover most situations where there is a personal work relationship with an 
employer except where the true agreement includes an unqualifi ed clause under 
which, when a worker is not required to provide a personal service, he or she can 
nominate a substitute. 133 As Anne Davies has succinctly put it:  ‘ “ Worker ” is not 
a  “ low-fat ” version of employee: it is a different concept altogether ’ . 134 It follows 
that, a broad approach to the  ‘ worker ’ concept, untied to the common law tests for 
 ‘ employee ’ , will encompass many zero hours arrangements, including intermittent 
working, so long as there is an obligation on the part of the ZHW to perform work 
or services for another person on each occasion when they accept an offer of work. 
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 C. Employment Protection of Zero Hours Workers — Examples of 
Entitlements and Limitations 
 Even where the law does provide formal protection for workers on ZHCs, whether 
they have the status of  ‘ employee ’ or  ‘ worker ’ , in practice it may be diffi cult for 
them to exercise their rights. For example, if the ZHW has a contract of employ-
ment, with at least one month ’ s continuous employment, which would include 
many shorter wage/work bargains with mutual obligations, he or she is entitled 
to a statement of written particulars of employment. 135 The written statement 
must include  ‘ terms and conditions relating to hours of work ’ including  ‘ nor-
mal hours of work ’ . 136 On one reading, this might suggest that, where there is an 
opaque ZHC, the employer would be forced to reveal regular working hours to the 
employee in the statement. However, the statement is no more than a refl ection 
of the employer ’ s interpretation of the terms and conditions contractually agreed 
between the parties. 137 The contract itself does not have to be in writing. 138 The 
statement does not replace the contract, nor does it create an obligation on the 
employer to fi x a set number of contractual hours per week or month, or to pro-
vide work on particular days or at certain times of the day. In a best case scenario, 
it could be argued, that if the employer has in practice offered fi xed hours on a 
regular basis this  ‘ crystallises ’ over time into a legal obligation that must be faith-
fully refl ected in the statement. 139 
 Bringing a claim for unfair dismissal will also be diffi cult for a ZHW. It may 
be possible to establish a global contract by linking together a series of contracts 
of employment and relying on the rule on temporary cessations to stick them 
together so as to establish the necessary qualifying period of two years ’ continuous 
employment. 140 However, there may be uncertainty over whether a temporary ces-
sation, with no further work being offered, amounts to a  ‘ dismissal ’ in law. 141 It is 
possible for the termination of a fi xed-term contract to be deemed a  ‘ dismissal ’ , 142 
but it would be relatively straightforward for the employer to show that such a 
dismissal is  ‘ fair ’ 143 in the absence of compelling evidence that he or she has acted 
unreasonably when compared to the standard of the  ‘ reasonable employer ’ . 144 
 ZHWs, including those with  ‘ worker ’ status, even if they are only offered work 
intermittently, will be entitled, when they are working, to the National Living Wage 
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(NLW) at an hourly rate, 145 a limit on their maximum weekly working hours, rest 
periods and paid holidays calculated on a pro-rata basis. 146 The right to be paid 
the NLW is important, not only as a statutory wage fl oor, but also because the 
legislation can be used to clamp down on abuses, such as clocking on and clocking 
off during times of inactivity or only paying staff when they are serving custom-
ers. 147 It also covers many  ‘ on-call ’ workers, such as care workers, who are required 
to be at, or close to, the workplace, and those who may have to sleep during part of 
their shift. 148 Under the legislation, hourly paid workers are entitled to the NLW 
not only for the time that they are actually working but also for time when they 
are  ‘ available at or near a place of work ’ . 149 Travelling time while on business, such 
as between appointments, is also included. 150 While the NLW provides important 
protection, it is not payable in situations when casual workers turn up for work in 
the hope of being hired but are turned away without work. 151 
 IV. Outlawing Abuses of Zero Hours Contracts and 
Proposals for Reform 
 A. Are Zero Hours Contracts Legal ? 
 In this part, measures to outlaw abuses of ZHCs and proposals to reform the law 
will be discussed. As Shanks J observed in a recent case before the EAT,  ‘ there can be 
no doubt that this is an area which is crying out for some legislative  intervention ’ . 152 
An immediate question, however, is whether ZHCs are legal. 153 According to the 
UK Government, in its December 2013 consultation on  ‘ Zero Hours Employment 
Contracts ’ , a ZHC  ‘ is a legitimate form of employment contract drawn up between 
employer and individual, providing both parties freely agree to it ’ . 154 This is a fairly 
obvious reference to the well-rooted common law notion of  ‘ freedom of contract ’ , 
but this assumes that the contract is a  ‘ freely negotiated agreement of two equal 
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parties in the market ’ . 155 In the absence of statutory protection, the conventional 
rule is that the parties ’ bargain is enforceable regardless of whether it is fair. 156 
However, the courts have come to recognise that the employment contract is a 
special type of relational contract to be interpreted and applied in the context of 
the inequality of bargaining power between the parties. 
 One might ask, how can an employment contract be lawful if it does not guaran-
tee that a worker will be provided with any work (or any further work) or, indeed, 
any specifi ed hours of work ? This is problematic because it is a basic tenet of the 
common law that the employee only has a right to be paid if he or she performs an 
obligation under the contract. It is the performance of this obligation that triggers 
the employer ’ s corresponding obligation to pay. 157 As Greer LJ succinctly put it in 
 Browning v Crumlin Valley Collieries Ltd :  ‘ the consideration for work is wages, and 
the consideration for wages is work ’ . 158 The absence of a guarantee of work has the 
effect, therefore, of undermining the purpose of the minimum wage — to provide 
a basic income — but there is no statutory or common law guarantee of minimum 
working hours. 159 It is only possible to secure a right to work, or to be paid for 
work not provided, if a term can be implied based on the agreement of the parties. 
In  Devonald v Rosser and Sons Ltd , 160 workers were laid off without pay but had no 
contractual provision specifying their hours of work. The contract did, however, 
specify a notice period to be applied before the employees could be dismissed. The 
Court of Appeal held that, during this contractual notice period, a term could be 
implied that the employer had a duty to offer a reasonable amount of work based 
on the hours normally worked. The employees were entitled to damages for the 
employer ’ s failure to provide that work. 
 An alternative approach at common law would be for the courts to imply that, at 
least some regular work should be offered to provide employees with a subsistence 
income, even if the contract is formally described as  ‘ zero hours ’ , on the basis that 
this would represent the reasonable expectations of the parties. 161 McGaughey, 
relying on the  ‘ true agreement ’ test in  Autoclenz , suggests that express contract 
terms referring to  ‘ zero hours ’ are one-sided and may  ‘ lie in a shadowy recess of 
borderline legality ’ . 162 This is an argument that is compelling, particularly in cases 
where it can be shown that  ‘ zero hours ’ clauses are a sham, as in  Pulse Healthcare , 
but it would not apply in situations where a ZHC accurately refl ects the agreement 
of the parties even if the ZHW would like to have more regular work. 163 This takes 
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us back to the point that there is no single type of ZHC but, on a case by case basis, 
a contract dressed up as  ‘ zero hours ’ may be shown, if regular hours of work are 
offered and accepted over an extended period, to be, in truth, a contract for a fi xed 
number of hours per week. 164 
 B. Proposals for Reform 
 Much of the discourse on ZHCs has been concerned with identifying ways to end 
the exploitation of these types of contracts or even to abolish them altogether. 
One possible solution to the problems of lawfulness of ZHCs, identifi ed above, 
would be to create a statutory presumption of illegality of ZHCs that could only 
be rebutted by objective justifi cation. 165 For example, if evidence shows that the 
contractual arrangement is fl exible in a way that genuinely suits both parties tak-
ing into account their unequal power relations. The diffi culty with proposals for 
reforming the law, by giving offi cial blessing to  ‘ fair ’ ZHCs, is that ZHCs have to 
defi ned and to an extent legitimised whilst simultaneously minimising abuse and 
setting core standards of protection for ZHWs. 166 
 This very specifi c focus on ZHC-specifi c legislative proposals is an understand-
able, and to an extent inevitable, short-term response to media reporting of abuses 
and the public demand for action. The danger is that a targeted approach leads 
to piecemeal measures that  ‘ legitimate precarity ’ 167 but do not address the wider 
challenge of meeting needs of contingent workers in the UK for security in work-
ing life. 
 i. Exclusivity Clauses 
 The UK Government consulted in 2013 on abuses of ZHCs and problems with 
how they were operating. 168 In the consultation, the underlying assumption of 
Government was that ZHWs were a positive phenomenon because they  ‘ sup-
port business fl exibility, making it easier to hire new staff and providing pathways 
to employment for young people ’ . 169 From this standpoint any action would be 
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targeted as a  ‘ crack down on any abuse and exploitation ’ by a small number of 
employers who were not behaving responsibly. 170 
 One of the main areas of concern identifi ed by the Government was  ‘ exclusivity 
clauses ’ , which prevented a ZHW from working for another employer, even if their 
current employer was not guaranteeing any hours of work. Even without legisla-
tion, such clauses, known as restrictive covenants, would be of doubtful legality at 
common law because of their coercive nature. 171 In the absence of a global con-
tract maintaining mutuality of obligation, exclusivity clauses are unenforceable 
in periods in between individual  ‘ spot contracts ’ as they amount to a restraint 
on the individual ’ s freedom to work. 172 Such clauses are deemed antithetical to 
the concepts of  ‘ choice and fl exibility ’ that provide the rationale for zero hours 
contracting. 173 
 CIPD evidence presented in 2013 found that 9 per cent of ZHWs reported that 
they had an exclusivity clause or believed that they were restricted from exercising 
their choice to take up work with additional employers. 174 After further consulta-
tion, which revealed that 83 per cent of 36,000 respondents supported an outright 
ban on exclusivity clauses in ZHCs, 175 the Government, wishing to be seen to be 
doing something in the wake of considerable public outrage over the exploitation 
of ZHWs, concluded that  ‘ exclusivity clauses were used to the detriment of indi-
viduals ’ 176 and introduced legislation banning them. The Small Business, Enter-
prise and Employment Act 2015 inserted a new section 27A into the Employment 
Rights Act 1996. The provision is the fi rst explicit statutory reference to the ZHC. 
It defi nes a ZHC as: 
 ‘ (1)  … a contract of employment or other worker ’ s contract under which 
(a)  the undertaking to do or perform work or services is an undertaking to do so 
conditionally on the employer making work or services available to the worker, 
and 
(b)  there is no certainty that any such work or services will be made available to 
the worker. 
 (2) For this purpose, an employer makes work or services available to a worker if the 
employer requests or requires the worker to do the work or perform the services ’. 
 On the one hand, this provision is suffi ciently broad to include both  ‘ employ-
ees ’ and  ‘ workers ’ . It recognises that all forms of employment, other than genuine 
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self-employment, involve a degree of dependency. On the other hand, it endorses 
exploitation of that dependency by permitting contracts rooted in uncertainty 
over working hours or even the very availability of work. The benign language 
of s 27A(2) implies a genuine choice on the part of the worker to accept or 
refuse work whenever it is made available by an employer. As has been shown in 
Part II.A above, the new system of Universal Credit creates a pressure on the ZHW 
to accept offers of work, however uncertain the hours and however low the pay, so 
as to avoid punitive welfare sanctions. 
 Exclusivity clauses are defi ned in s 27A as follows: 
 ‘ (3) Any provision of a zero hours contract which — 
(a)  prohibits the worker from doing work or performing services under another 
contract or under any other arrangement, or 
(b)  prohibits the worker from doing so without the employer ’ s consent, 
 is unenforceable against the worker ’ . 
 An exclusivity clause is thus deemed to be an automatically unfair contract term 
without reference to whether the individual who is subject to it is an employee 
or a worker. 177 The law is stronger, in certain respects, than parallel legislation 
concerning unfair terms in consumer contracts which outlaw some  ‘ unfair ’ terms 
whilst allowing others based on satisfying a test of  ‘ reasonableness ’ . 178 The legisla-
tion also provides scope, in a new s 27B, inserted into the Employment Rights Act 
1996, for the Secretary of State to make further regulatory provisions to penalise 
employers for using exclusivity clauses or to tighten the law if there is evidence 
of workers who ignore an exclusivity requirement being refused further work. 179 
Under this provision, new Regulations have been issued to provide for individual 
redress in cases when an  ‘ employee ’ is dismissed or a  ‘ worker ’ is subjected to a 
detriment for breaching an exclusivity clause as defi ned in s 27A(3) above. 180 The 
introduction of a redress mechanism provides protection to all ZHWs who are 
adversely affected by being refused work by an employer relying on an exclusiv-
ity clause. In the case of  ‘ employees ’ , dismissals for this reason will be regarded 
as automatically unfair. 181 Moreover, claims can be brought without the need 
to satisfy a qualifying period of employment. 182 Individuals seeking redress can 
bring a complaint before an ET and, if the complaint is well founded, they will be 
entitled to compensation for the infringement and any loss attributable to it. 183 
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 Compensable losses may include expenses incurred and loss of benefi ts that the 
complainants might be reasonably expected to receive. 184 
 Banning exclusivity clauses is welcome, from a protective labour law standpoint, 
because the new law provides clarity in striking out a particular form of exploita-
tion affecting an estimated 125,000 ZHC workers and also remedies for violations. 
This group of ZHWs are now free to seek additional work to boost their income. 185 
However, bearing in mind the protection against trade restrictive clauses at com-
mon law, and the relative paucity of these types of exclusivity clauses, this measure 
provides, at best, a statutory gloss on the law without addressing the fundamental 
problems for the worker arising from the inherent ambiguity and unpredictability 
of no minimum hours contracting. Moreover, there is a danger that providing a 
statutory defi nition offers yet further scope for  ‘ rogue employers ’ to fi nd a way of 
evading the exclusivity ban by, for example, shaping contract terms that may fall 
outside of the defi nition. 186 
 Further measures are anticipated in s 27B, which allows the Secretary of State to 
take additional regulatory steps to modify ZHCs and confer rights on ZHWs. 187 
Several suggestions, made independently of Government, are discussed below. 
 ii. Increasing Transparency in ZHCs 
 Lack of transparency in ZHCs was highlighted as an issue in the UK Govern-
ment ’ s consultation exercise in 2013. 188 The provisions banning exclusivity clauses 
included a defi nition of ZHCs but it does not necessarily cover all arrangements 
where there is a lack of certainty about the number of hours of work arising from 
a dearth of information, or confl icting information, about the contract terms. In 
turn, an information vacuum leads to uncertainty for the worker about present 
and future earnings and entitlement to welfare benefi ts. 189 
 Under the law as it stands, statutory provisions concerning the right to a written 
statement of particulars of employment, including information about hours and 
pay, are only applicable to employees with two months ’ continuity of employ-
ment. 190 Eligible employees can demand a written statement from their employer 
and seek to rely on it, if it precisely refl ects the essential elements of their contract 
of employment, or challenge any inaccuracies, by bringing a claim before an ET. 191 
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The right to a written statement is a modest measure fi rst introduced in 1963. 192 
It does not fundamentally affect the balance of power between the employer and 
the employee but it does help to demystify the terms of their relationship. Sir John 
Hare MP, the Minister of Labour when the original legislation was introduced, 
explained that its purpose was to enforce the principle that  ‘ workers ’ obligations 
and rights should be clear and in writing ’ . 193 At the time, the concept of a ZHC, 
as we understand it today, was unknown. More than 50 years later, those ZHWs 
and other casual workers categorised as  ‘ workers ’ without employee status, or 
whose contracts of employment are too short and lack mutuality of obligation, 
are denied this basic right of information. It would, therefore, be straightforward 
and relatively unburdensome for employers to be obliged by law to issue an accu-
rate written statement of contract particulars, including hours of work and rates 
of pay, to all  ‘ workers ’ employed by them, regardless of the type of contract, at the 
commencement of their employment. 194 It has also been suggested that employers 
should confi rm employment status in the statement and be required to state their 
policy on when the worker should be notifi ed that work is available. 195 Such an 
extension of legal scope would necessarily cover all ZHCs, except in cases of genu-
ine self-employment, and would give some measure of certainty about the terms 
of employment. It would not, however, guarantee minimum hours of work or any 
guarantee of future work. 
 iii. Sharing the Risk of Insecurity and Income 
 One of the main drivers of ZHCs, identifi ed in Part II.B above, is the  ‘ demutualisa-
tion ’ of the employment relationship whereby the risks of insecurity and income 
are placed on the worker who can be  ‘ zeroed out ’ and  ‘ zeroed in ’ to maximise 
fl exibility. 196 This kind of one-sided fl exibility puts huge pressure on ZHWs and 
other casual workers who will face uncertainty over paying bills and entitlement 
to welfare benefi ts. In an independent report for the opposition Labour Party, 
 Norman Pickavance, recommended a sharing of this risk of insecurity between the 
employer and the ZHW. 197 Pickavance proposed, inter alia, that employers should 
only be able to require availability in direct proportion to the amount of work 
they offer. For example, employers would only be able to require additional avail-
ability for a maximum of 50 per cent of contracted hours. 198 This would ensure 
that workers would normally not be required to be available when there is no 
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guarantee of work. Legislation could be introduced to make clauses to that effect 
unenforceable. In order to maintain some fl exibility, additional availability might 
be possible for on-call staff if they are paid a retention fee by employers. 
 Another example of sharing the risk of insecurity would be to implement the 
proposal of the UK House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee for employers 
to compensate workers for the inconvenience of arriving for work but fi nding that 
none is available. 199 Such a compensation scheme would discourage, but not erad-
icate, a particularly inimical exploitative practice. The Committee also proposed 
a rule requiring an employer to give a minimum notice period of work. 200 Along 
similar lines, legislation has been adopted in New Zealand, requiring notice to be 
given to the worker when a shift is cancelled. 201 The introduction of such require-
ments would shift the burden of risk in the employment relation back onto the 
employer, albeit that neither measure would be as strong as the former National 
Dock Labour Scheme which guaranteed work for dockers and effectively ended 
 On The Waterfront 202 style casual working at ports before its abolition in 1989 dur-
ing the fi rst phase of labour market deregulation in the UK. 203 
 iv. Guaranteeing Regular Working Hours 
 Whilst each of the proposals discussed above would mitigate some of the worst 
abuses of ZHCs none of them adequately addresses the precariousness of work-
ing under a contract with no guaranteed working hours. The Pickavance Report 
suggested a highly convoluted measure to convert a ZHC into a more standard 
employment contract. 204 It proposed that, after six months on a ZHC, workers 
who are in practice working  ‘ regular hours ’ should have the right to request a con-
tract other than a ZHC which would provide a minimum amount of work. 205 
Employers would only be able to refuse such a request  ‘ if they can demonstrate 
that their business needs cannot be met by any other form of fl exible contract ’ . 206 
The concept of a  ‘ right to request ’ a change of contract is modelled on the  ‘ right 
to request fl exible working ’ for employees with six months ’ continuous employ-
ment. 207 The proposal would appear to offer considerable scope for an employer 
to refuse such a request on business grounds. 208 
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 217  As suggested by E McGaughey (n 153) 7. 
 As a fall back, Pickavance proposed that, after 12 months of continuous employ-
ment, workers on regular hours (suggested as a minimum of eight hours per week 
over the reference period) would have the right to be offered a contract other than 
zero hours which would provide a minimum amount of work. The law would 
ensure that this happened automatically and refl ect the actual hours being regu-
larly worked. The proposal allows for an individual opt-out from conversion to a 
regular hours contract subject to independent advice and freely given consent by 
the worker. 209 This proposal is quite similar to the law in the Netherlands under 
which a contract of employment guaranteeing minimum hours is implied after 
three months working on-call. 210 
 Pickavance anticipated that such rules would be liable to abuse by  ‘ unscrupulous 
employers ’ who might lay people off to break continuity of employment or  ‘ game ’ 
the hours during the reference period by using fi xed one or two hour contracts. 
Bridging provisions, similar to the rules on  ‘ temporary cessation ’ , discussed in Part 
III.B above, would be introduced to overcome this problem. 211 
 Pickavance ’ s fall back proposal represents the most serious attempt to devise a 
solution to the maximum fl exibility/minimum security conundrum that is a typi-
cal feature of ZHCs in the UK even in cases where the worker is working regular 
hours. However, despite the proposed safeguards, there would be a twofold prob-
lem if it were implemented. Firstly, the right to end the ZHC after 12 months would 
be dependent on satisfying mutuality of obligations at least during each individual 
engagement, as in  Prater . 212 This may be diffi cult to prove over a 12-month period 
unless, as in  Pulse Healthcare , 213 there is strong evidence that a zero hours clause 
in the contract is a sham. Secondly, the proposal would not assist the many ZHCs 
who work irregular hours, as in  Saha , 214 and who are, in practice, the most vulner-
able ZHWs in the greatest need of a standard employment contract to provide 
them with more certainty as to working hours, pay and benefi t entitlement. 
 In New Zealand, a more radical proposal has been introduced, effective from 
1 April 2016, 215 stipulating that employers must specify the number of guaranteed 
hours of work when the worker is required to be available. 216 Workers can refuse 
extra hours without being subjected to any detriment. What it does not do, con-
trary to some reporting, is set a default minimum number of hours per week. 217 
It does not ban zero hours working in contracts where there is no  mutuality of 
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 obligation, to offer and accept work, but it does prohibit ZHCs that require avail-
ability without a guarantee of work. Protection is reinforced by a provision that 
prevents an employer from requiring the worker to perform additional hours 
without showing reasonable grounds and, where such grounds are shown, com-
pensates the employee for being available. 218 If imported into the UK, it would 
provide a simpler, more effective mechanism to provide some certainty about 
working hours requiring the availability of the worker but it would not end no 
minimum hours contracting. 
 V. Conclusion — Towards  ‘ Horizontal Equity ’ 
for all Workers 
 Each of the proposals for labour law reform discussed in the previous part has 
merit in addressing and, to an extent, rectifying some of the worst abuses of ZHCs. 
Fundamentally, however, what this study has revealed is that, even if some  ‘ light-
touch ’ measures are introduced to regulate the practice of zero hours contract-
ing, 219 the dynamic of casualisation in the UK labour market is set to continue 
with the ZHW situated at the extreme end of the arc of precariousness. Other fac-
tors, such as social security reform, following the introduction of Universal Credit, 
further privatisation, and outsourcing of services, will tend to increase reliance on 
the ZHC model. 220 Low paid sectors more dependent on ZHWs, such as hotels 
and catering, retail and social care, can be expected to continue to segment from 
the rest of the labour market. 
 As was shown in part III of this chapter, many ZHWs are situated in a twilight 
zone of employment status hovering somewhere between  ‘ employee ’ and  ‘ worker ’ 
with cases falling either side of the distinction based on the weight given to par-
ticular facts gleaned from the contractual documentation, the labels used by the 
employer to describe the relationship, and the conduct of the parties. Even if a 
ZHW passes the common law tests for recognition as an  ‘ employee ’ , his or her for-
tunes may founder on the  ‘ archaic rules ’ 221 of continuity of employment. Indeed, 
it is somewhat ironic that several of the published proposals for reform of ZHCs 
require the worker to cross the threshold of a continuity period. The use of conti-
nuity provisions only serves to highlight the divide between core and contingent 
workers in the UK ’ s two-tier labour market. 
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 Against this backdrop, workers on ZHCs will remain contingent in the absence 
of more stringent measures placing a duty on the part of the employer to provide a 
default minimum hours ’ requirement and a guaranteed regular income for work-
ers who have made themselves available for work. Targeted measures aimed at 
regularising ZHCs will not be suffi cient, however, to bring about a less segmented 
and more inclusive labour market in which the dignity of the worker is respected. 
We must understand the issue of ZHCs to be totemic for social actors seeking to 
respond to the challenges arising from the surge in many different types of fl ex-
ible working which have transformed the expectations of employers and workers 
about fl exibility and security. 222 For this reason, it is necessary to extend the per-
sonal scope of employment protection legislation to include all those in diverse 
non-standard but dependent relationships of which ZHCs are one small part. 223 
This does not mean that divergences in protection between core and contingent 
workers can be easily eradicated but certain changes can be made to achieve more 
of an equilibrium. 
 Two reforms would serve as starting blocks for the development of a more 
inclusive system of labour law in the UK. 
 First, the application of continuity rules impacts most harshly on intermittent 
workers, such as ZHCs, who often work for the same employer for long peri-
ods. These workers will usually have contracts of employment when working, 
but continuity of employment will be broken when they are  ‘ zeroed-out ’ or laid 
off between engagements. In order to overcome this problem, the law could be 
modernised straightforwardly, as Zoe Adams and Simon Deakin suggest, to add 
together all periods of employment with the same employer while disregarding 
 ‘ breaks ’ in continuity. 224 This would minimise abuses designed to take advantage 
of the continuity rules and widen access to rights, such as maternity pay, which 
require a qualifying period of continuous employment. 225 
 Second, a statutory presumption of employment could be introduced. 226 
It would allow for essential employment protection laws to be applicable more 
widely. The present system in the UK no longer fi ts the reality of the employment 
relationship. As has been shown in part III.B above, much of the litigation on the 
status of casual workers has concerned sham labels and bogus terms in employ-
ment contracts. What is required is more transparency, and therefore certainty, 
about both the scope and the content of the employment relationship. Guidance 
can be found in ILO Recommendation No 198, which is designed to ensure that 
workers whose contractual position is uncertain are not deprived of the legal 
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 protection to which they are entitled. 227 It seeks to encourage transparency and 
effectiveness of laws concerning the existence of an employment relationship. 228 
The Recommendation suggests a range of indicators as a basis for a legal presump-
tion of an employment relationship. The indicators include  ‘ control ’ and  ‘ integra-
tion of the worker in the organisation of the enterprise ’ which are drawn from 
the common law tests for  ‘ employee ’ . 229 Other indicators fi t the broader  ‘ worker ’ 
defi nition in UK law, 230 specifi cally where  ‘ work  … is performed solely or mainly 
for the benefi t of another person ’ and  ‘ carried out personally by the worker ’ . 231 The 
Recommendation also identifi es socio-economic indicators such as  ‘ the fact that 
[payment of] remuneration constitutes the worker ’ s sole or principal source of 
income ’ . It does not include factors that negate proof of employment such as the 
absence of mutuality of obligation. 
 If the UK was serious about updating its employment law to be more inclusive, 
consistent with the  ‘ fl exicurity ’ paradigm, it would consult about the content of 
the most appropriate indicators to form the point of reference for a new proof of 
employment law or, if a normative measure is not the preferred route, a Code of 
Practice on establishing an employment relationship might be a fi rst step. Con-
sultation might extend to suggestions about the material scope of employment 
protection to be afforded to all those with proof of employment based on the indi-
cators. For example, this could include core rights to, inter alia, a minimum wage, 
safe working conditions, paid holidays, maximum working hours, maternity leave 
and pay and other family leave rights, non-discrimination, joining a union, taking 
collective action and protection against arbitrary dismissal. The logic of reaching 
an agreement on these matters might lead to a decision to have a single category of 
 ‘ employee ’ for all those in a position of economic subordination or dependency by 
reference to the indicators. Alternatively, the separate categories of  ‘ employee ’ and 
 ‘ worker ’ could be retained but the indicators would help to clarify the essential ele-
ments of  ‘ employee ’ or  ‘ worker ’ status and form a basis for deciding on the detailed 
content of the employment protection afforded to every  ‘ worker ’ . 
 To conclude, the zero hours culture has fl ourished in the UK ’ s increasingly fl ex-
ible and  ‘ demutualised ’ labour market. 232 For some employers, zero hours con-
tracting has become an art form for exploitation by means of transferring the 
burden of insecurity and risk to the worker. ZHWs are further disadvantaged by 
benefi t rules that increase pressure on them to be available to accept offers of work 
even when there is no guarantee of minimum hours. In the absence of a uniform 
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defi nition of ZHCs, workers who are working, often irregularly, over a period of 
time for the same employer are faced with uncertainty about their legal status 
and the scope of employment protection afforded to them. It is, therefore, essen-
tial for coercive ZHCs to be challenged to test their lawfulness on a case by case 
basis. Some of the most egregious abuses of ZHCs could be stamped out, or at 
least minimised, by adopting proposals that have been put forward or using the 
New Zealand legislation as a blueprint for further regulation. More stringent 
measures are needed to guarantee minimum hours and income security. Ulti-
mately, however, the divide between core and contingent work in the UK will 
only be bridged if measures are initiated to widen access to employment rights for 
intermittent workers like ZHWs and create a statutory presumption of employ-
ment to which a minimum standard of employment protection can be attached. 
 In the UK, the majority of employers do not use ZHCs as part of their business 
model or, to the extent that they do offer them, there is evidence that fl exibil-
ity often suits both parties. An alternative vision of a competitive, more produc-
tive, social market economy is possible in which workers ’ dignity is respected, 
more legal certainty is provided in the employment relation, and there is greater 
opportunity for full engagement of all workers in the enterprise. As Judy Fudge 
has observed, the most important shift in the discipline of labour law has been 
towards individualisation. 233 The task of labour law in the twenty-fi rst century is 
to regulate for fl exibility by providing  ‘ horizontal equity ’ between workers in ever 
more diverse working relationships. 234 
 
 
 233  J  Fudge ,  ‘ Labour as a  ‘ Fictive Commodity ’ :  Radically Reconceptualizing Labour Law ’ in  G  Davi-
dov and  B  Langille (eds),  The Idea of Labour Law ( OUP ,  2011 )  120-136, 124 . 
 234  ibid. See also,  M  Link ,  ‘ Labour Law and the New Inequality ’ ( 2009 )  59 UNBLJ  14 – 47 . 

